Friday, 3 May 2013

When democracies make the wrong decisions*


By denying Dzhokhar Tsarnaev his Miranda Rights, and by conducting secret executions, citing prioritisation of public safety, USA and India - two torch-bearers for democracy - are jeopardising the very virtues they strive to protect.

The recent events in both India and the US have revealed some startling truths about democracies. In the last six months, India has secretly hanged two terrorism convicts, after a span of eight years on the death row; meanwhile, in the US, Obama’s Department of Justice has pushed for the Boston bombing accused, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, to be questioned before he is read out his right to an attorney, thus challenging the very ethos the two democracies are based on. The two countries have successfully played up the threat to democracy from terrorism, to an extent where the both the US and India have been bending laws to suit the prevailing attitudes towards the convicted.

For the “greater good”

India executed two high profile convicts in a span of four months - Ajmal Kasab, hanged in November 2012, was one of the terrorists involved in the attacks on Mumbai in 2008, while Afzal Guru, hanged in February 2013, was one of those accused of the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. One of the main reasons India’s Home Minister cited for conducting the two executions in secret was “to maintain peace and keep protests to the minimum”. In the case of Afzal Guru, who received support from various groups especially in the turbulent Kashmir Valley, the Government attempted to justify the secret execution by stating that it was the only way to ensure a smooth passage to the gallows. Minutes after Guru was hanged, the Valley was put under curfew and security was increased to avoid any violent clashes or mass protests against government establishments.

In the American case, the Obama administration had already allowed for the retracting of Miranda Rights for terror suspects, in March 2011, thus permitting investigators to question such suspects without a lawyer, for as long as they deemed necessary to obtain as much information as possible. This, according to lawmakers and investigators, could help in acquiring critical information which could be used to prevent further attacks. In the wake of the Boston bombings, influential lawmakers, including Senator Lindsey Graham, called for interrogating Tsarnaev before reading him his Miranda Rights since he, as a terrorist, posed a greater and more complex threat to American society than any other criminal.

But how is a country that is capable of abridging laws on a temporary basis, fit to protect its people and their shared values? How can a democracy make an exception to its laws when this is the very same fabric that it uses to protect its people in ordinary times and in times of turbulence?

Tailoring the law to one’s convenience

The Indian government has erred on several counts.

According to both International and Indian law, a death penalty case deserves to be considered for clemency if the convict has been kept waiting for too long. The emotional trauma to both the convict and the family is to be taken into account before confirming the death sentence to a convict who has been waiting for a prolonged period. By disregarding Guru’s prolonged wait, the government defied the Supreme Court of India and the International Court of Justice. Moreover, in order to prevent any further delay in Guru’s execution, the President had rejected Guru’s petition in February 2013 and this decision had not been made public. Since he was charged with terrorism and was portrayed as an enemy of the nation, it was tough for Guru to find legal representation, making it easier for the government to cover up its misconduct.

In the case of Pakistani terrorist Ajmal Kasab, the Home Minister said the execution was conducted in secret to prevent any human rights activists or others from filing a petition against the death sentence and delaying the process.

According to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, no individual can be deprived of life except according to the procedure of law. This would include informing the family well before the execution so they may say their final goodbyes. In the case of Kasab, the Government of India had supposedly intimated his family in Pakistan, who were unable to visit him before his execution. However the same was not done for Guru, an Indian citizen, whose request to be shifted to Srinagar prison so that he could be visited by his family, including his ailing mother, was rejected, and no timely intimation of his impending execution was sent to his family.  Guru’s family received a letter two days after he was executed, denying them the right to say goodbye or challenge the Presidential rejection of clemency in the Supreme Court. This, compounded with the fact that Guru’s body was buried within Delhi’s Tihar Jail without his family’s participation in the funeral, makes the execution an obscene affair. The act of secrecy and denying Guru’s family the right to have his body is not only a violation of human rights but also against the law, and by bypassing the necessary procedures, the government has undermined the justice system, making the handling of the entire situation unconstitutional.

Similarly, in USA, Miranda Rights were put in place to prevent any mistreatment of the accused in the hands of investigators. Withdrawing Miranda Rights for a suspect arrested on American soil could set a precedent that might lead to misappropriation of the power wielded by investigators of terrorism-related crimes.

Real challenges to democracy

Is the threat against a nation’s democracy, national security and sovereignty so large that the governments must abridge due processes and bend an entire structure of law to do whatever may be necessary to safeguard the nation’s social fabric?

In Guru’s case, he was not allowed the judicial recourse every convict in India is entitled to under the Indian Constitution. It is a legal requirement to inform Guru of his rejected appeal, and allow him to contest this decision in court. Moreover, it is unconstitutional to suggest that the government was compelled to carry out the execution in secret as a fair legal procedure would have attracted mass protests and disturbed peace. As a democracy, are we not entitled to non-violent mass protests?

Defending their decisions, both India and USA have taken a firm stand against terrorism, saying that they would take extreme measures to keep terrorism and terrorist activities off their soil. The US has gone so far as to declare war against anyone who takes up arms against the nation. Additionally, the American Supreme Court has allowed for the Miranda Rights to be retracted in the case of ‘public safety’; given that an average of 31,537 people in the US become victims of gun violence every year[i] as opposed to 400 US casualties on average in Afghanistan[ii], this should be applicable when interrogating shooters too. However, there is no evidence to prove that shooters, a larger threat to public safety in the US, have their Miranda Rights rolled back.

In such cases where the law is abridged to provide terrorists with stricter punishments, the two democracies need to be able to put an end to arbitrary distinctions between them and other criminals – who are an equal threat to public safety – to justify the former deserving rare or strict punishments. How does a democratic state distinguish between a terrorist, a shooter, a serial killer or a rapist in terms of treatment at the interrogation and/or when handing out punishment? Both states have failed to convey how one is a larger threat to public safety than the rest.

For democracies that are built on values of fairness, equal opportunity and a well-defined justice system, it is worrying when their governments are ready to disregard these very laws even temporarily. The move is self-defeating in a way that it marginalises the accused even further. This, as we have seen in the case of Kasab and Guru, makes it difficult for them to avail of legal help, thus challenging the very system put together to protect its people. This blatant disregard for the laws of the land and International Law undermines the ethos and shared values of these democracies.

Such abuse of the law can result in disenchantment among marginalised sections of society, making it easier for terrorist organisations to recruit from them. This in turn affects the manner in which the country can respond to terror threats, making nations more vulnerable, and thus undermining public support and international co-operation.

The democratic ethos need to be protected, even in times of crisis. Every time we allow governments to bend legal provisions on a case by case basis, we could very well be paving the way for them to take further liberties with our rights.

For India, the list of secret executions may not have ended. Devender Pal Singh Bhullar, a Khalistani extremist accused of the 1993 car bombing in New Delhi, has been on the death row for 20 years. His mercy petition was recently rejected by the Supreme Court despite the long wait. Given the two decade long trauma and laws suggesting that a delay in execution allow for commutation of the sentence, the government may take measures in its own hands as it has done before. Unfortunately, if the laws have been bent once to favour the government, there will be little to no hesitation to do so again, especially given that there are too few voices expressing dissent.

What is required is a strong collective voice that prevents the government from acting unconstitutionally, no matter how heinous the crime. Justice is meant to be a deterrent, not a tool to extract revenge.


*An abridged version of the blog has been published in The Heptagon Post: http://www.heptagonpost.com/Rao/When_Democracies_Make_Wrong_Decisions

Sunday, 14 October 2012

Countering Terrorism in India: Taking a page out of Indonesia’s book

Indonesia has witnessed insurgencies and terrorism, especially post the Bali bombings of 2002. Since then, the Government of Indonesia has taken steps to counter terrorists and terror networks in the region without damaging people’s faith in the system.

The Indonesian government has separated their counter-terrorism forces from their armed forces. Indonesia introduced Detachment 88, on June 30, 2003, set up with the help of the American and Australian governments. The force is entirely Indonesian with a geographically well spread out intelligence service. These forces have a separate deradicalisation unit that take on militants and help them deal with captivity better and convince them against the use of violence.

The unit is aware of who they are working with and are made to read and understand the Qur’an. Captured militants are given a copy of the Qur’an and are taught that jihad is only a very small portion of the Holy Book. Experts in religious studies guide the unit with just the amount of information and empathy they require in their jobs.

The inmates are considered ideologically confused individuals rather than hardened criminals. This helps improve understanding towards the inmates and facilitates communication. The unit works towards strengthening the channels of communication between them and the inmates.

The detachment is not allowed to use any form of torture to get the desired information from the inmates. Instead, they are questioned politely and repeatedly in the presence of the Qur’an. The method, as simple as it sounds, is said to work. It helps to convert terrorists into obliging sources. Since the inmates are an abundant source of information with terrorist locations and their plans, it makes sense to win their confidence.

In order to extend a hand of comfort, the prisoners often pray in the company of their captors. This brings about a feeling of trust and faith thus reducing the gap between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The inmates begin to realise their captors are not infidels. Many hardliners have changed their stance and begun assisting the police in nabbing and converting more militants. The families of those who assist the police are taken care of by the government in terms of the children’s tuition fees, spouses’ employment and wedding expenses.

The unit is given a background of all the inmates to induce empathy amongst unit members.

The information makes it easier for the unit member to treat each inmate differently and understand the prisoner better.

This relationship does not end by sentencing of the inmate to imprisonment. The detachment ensures that once the former captive is released, he is employed. The government plays an active role in ensuring that the former prisoner is treated humanely, given protection and guaranteed a job. The lure of a better pay package with no assurance does not seem so enticing after all.

The principle of converting a terrorist into an informer is humane and less pain inducing.

Statistics say the method has helped change at least 50 per cent of hardliners into renouncing violence and/or becoming police informers. The same principles can be applied to Kashmir while combating insurgency.

For years the Government of India has dealt with the Kashmir issue publicly and has come under the scanner of various human rights organisations; it has been the bone of contention between India and the Unites States of America, and has been the basis on which India and Pakistan have defined their relationship.

Kashmir has always reaped the benefits of better relations between India and Pakistan during peace dialogues - trade and transport routes and the flow of people from Pakistan occupied Kashmir in to the India. Kashmiris felt the repercussions of the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 after the central government decided to revoke their benefits. This and the constant presence of armed forces in the Valley have led to more than one bloody protest against the Indian institution.

Successive governments have treated the unrest in Kashmir as a law and order problem that can be silenced by suppression and force. Consecutive governments have failed to see the issue as an identity crisis rather than an anomaly in peace. Adding to this, in 1990, the army was called to bring peace and order.

The government implemented the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act (AFSPA) the same year never repealing it since. The Act, given its draconian nature and the atrocities on human rights, has attracted international attention. Local political parties have used the Act as a raison d’ĂȘtre for coming into power. The youth and parties like the Hurriyat Conference used the Act to justify violent protests in the Valley.

The Act has managed to maintain law and order but only for a short period of time. The dissent in the Valley has been difficult to judge given the increasing number of people in the region coming out to exercise their vote. However, peace in Kashmir will be unattainable unless the Indian government is able to make some serious policy changes towards the state.

The Narasimha government did try to initiate change with the creation of the National Human Rights Commission in 1993. The organisation demonstrated autonomy but has been unable to bring perpetrators to justice given how information is shrouded under the label of official secrets.

The Army, with much success, have converted former militants into ikhwans or informers.

They work to bolster the security of villages and divulge information to the armed forces about terrorist activity within the area. The army uses former militants covered with mask to pick suspected terrorists whilst keeping their identity intact.

However, these concepts have clashed with the AFSPA. The issue is far from forgotten.

People claim they have been cheated time and again by the local and central government, resorting to violence. The Government of India seems to have failed in capturing the hearts and minds of people in its struggle to initiate Kashmir into mainland India.

The Kashmir issue is not one to die soon. It will take a while before the Kashmiris are ready to start afresh. A policy change in the right direction, however, could provide the required impetus for the paradigm shift to take place.

Introducing a team, like the Detachment Unit in Indonesia, will take time in India.

However, given the demographics in Kashmir, adopting this model will not be impossible. A small step towards repealing the AFSPA in Jammu and Kashmir and later in other disturbed areas can be the first step towards winning the hearts and minds of the people for a long lasting relationship.

Wednesday, 1 August 2012

The Bridge to Lanka: India’s changing Foreign Policy towards Sri Lanka, and the way forward


Three years after the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka, the government is still struggling to integrate former Tamil Tigers into society. After the war, the Sri Lankan government made it mandatory for former fighters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to undergo a six stage rehabilitation programme. The two year long programme grants them general amnesty if they complete it successfully. If they don’t participate, however, they will face terrorism charges. Nevertheless, former Tigers who have completed the programme are having a hard time coming to terms with their past, and resuming normal lives.

Given the Sri Lankan government’s ineffective efforts to reconcile with the Tamil community and rehabilitate internally displaced persons (IDPs), it becomes imperative to look at how India will react to this conflict next door. India’s position as a regional power in South Asia with a large and influential Tamil population meant that the international community has always expected India to play a significant role in conflict management in the region. However, history, culture and politics have influenced Indo-Sri Lankan ties from the very beginning of the conflict.

Despite Sri Lanka’s reluctance to offer citizenship to Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka after independence in 1948, India and the island country maintained friendly ties over the years, given their shared history. However, things changed in the 70s, when discontent amidst the Sri Lankan Tamil community gave rise to a youth-led uprising, and the subsequent birth of the LTTE. Sporadic violent attacks against the government won the LTTE support and sympathisers in the Tamil community.

In particular, the agitation in Sri Lanka ignited passions across the border in India’s Tamil Nadu. The central government in India, led by Indira Gandhi, was determined not to isolate the Tamil population and thus prescribed a hardening of India’s foreign policy towards Sri Lanka. Gandhi’s government went all out in support of Tamil rebel groups, to the extent of providing ammunition to the LTTE as well as training them on Indian territory. This stance was strongly pursued to keep external influences at bay and ensure India’s sphere of influence in South Asia.

After Mrs Gandhi’s assassination, her son Rajiv Gandhi brought about a 180 degree policy change, with efforts to bring peace to the island country. Upon assuming power, Rajiv Gandhi officially put an end to India’s assistance to the Tamil Tigers, both monetary and military. He wanted India to play the role of a negotiator in the conflict, and made several attempts to mediate between the two parties. India imposed a ceasefire in Sri Lanka in the hope of disbanding and disarming the rebelling Tamils, and bringing about peaceful negotiations. To ensure that the LTTE laid down its arms, he sent the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to the LTTE strongholds in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka. The decision led to the loss of lives of many IPKF officials, Tamil rebels and civilians in Sri Lanka. The move fuelled strong discontent among the LTTE, leading to Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1989, during his visit to Tamil Nadu.

With all evidence pointing to the LTTE, the rebel group was categorised as a terrorist organisation, with Prabhakaran, its founder, becoming a wanted man in India. This called for yet another policy change towards Sri Lanka. From 1991, India decided not to interfere in matters pertaining to the LTTE, labelling it as Sri Lanka’s internal matter. However, India did crack down on LTTE supporters in Tamil Nadu supplying ammunition to the group.

The Sri Lankan government also opposed mediation by other countries till 2002, when Norway was allowed to mediate with the LTTE. India began to keep a watchful eye on affairs in Sri Lanka. While not overtly interfering, India would occasionally call for political settlement, while also maintaining that it wanted Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and integrity to remain intact. This could be seen as India’s way of dealing with the spill-over of the LTTE conflict – fear of Tamil separatism within its borders and Tamil refugees entering India for succour.

In 2005, Mahinda Rajpaksa, a right-wing politician, won the presidential elections in Sri Lanka and took a strong stand against the LTTE. He strengthened military capabilities, in preparation to put an end to the LTTE. Gradually moving onto the offensive, the Sri Lankan armed forces advanced into territories controlled by the LTTE by 2007. As the war intensified, India started providing military support to the Sri Lankan forces, in the form of training and defence equipment. Due to pressure on the Centre from the Indian Tamil community, India could not overtly support Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE. However, India did clandestinely gift Sri Lankan armed forces with helicopters and an off-shore patrol vessel, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute[i]. Citing the need to protect Indian fishermen, India deployed her navy and coast guard to patrol the sea. This brought the Sea Tigers (LTTE’s naval wing) under control. It was in Indian interests to see the Sri Lankan government crush the LTTE, to put an end to Tamil secessionism within Indian borders. China’s increasing influence in the region was also said to be a factor in pushing India towards providing Sri Lanka with assistance, despite DMK’s (a pro-LTTE party part of the UPA coalition) disapproval.

The Sri Lankan forces advanced steadily, and by 2008, the LTTE was forced into a corner. The rebels began to use civilians as human shields to hide from the incessant shelling, in the hope that this would garner international support for a ceasefire, allowing them time to regroup. With an eye on its own Tamil population, India publicly denounced Sri Lanka’s war conduct and said it would work towards improving the humanitarian situation. However, no action was taken; the DMK’s call for solidarity and support for the Tamil community in Sri Lanka did not translate to any policy change in the Centre.

In mid-2009, the LTTE was finally defeated when its leaders were declared dead and the remaining rebels chose to surrender.  In spite of international pressure on Sri Lanka to curb the violence, India supported Sri Lanka, in the hope to counter Chinese influence in South Asia, and offered support in reconstruction efforts.
Riding high on victory, Mahinda Rajpaksa called for early elections in 2010 to leverage popular support. This move attracted brickbats from the international community, which was already disappointed with Sri Lanka’s handling of the war’s endgame. It raised questions about political processes post the civil war, and highlighted the existing humanitarian crisis.

India’s stand on Sri Lanka took its toll on the Congress-DMK coalition when it lost out to AIADMK in Tamil Nadu during the 2011 state elections. The Congress-led UPA realised it had to act decisively, if it wanted to be seen as a force to reckon with in the south. In March 2012, India voted in favour of the UNHRC resolution demanding an action plan for rehabilitation and reconciliation of the displaced, missing and victims’ families. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, however, qualified his decision by saying that while India supports the Tamil community of Sri Lanka, it does not plan to interfere with Sri Lanka’s internal affairs. The current coalition, with DMK partnership, at the Centre and Congress’ wish to return to Tamil Nadu politics will prevent India from making overtly friendly foreign policy decisions regarding Sri Lanka. India will offer support only at a grass root level where it can be seen as aiding the Tamil population in Sri Lanka.

In conclusion, India has realised the need for it to pursue the issue of Tamil re-integration without compromising Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. Going forward, India should look at soft power diplomacy in the form of student exchange programmes, cultural programmes and sporting events. These would help initiate a cross-ethnic dialogue and sensitise the youth and adults on both sides towards the conflict, and the need for reconciliation. The Indian government should also help in bottom-up projects – rather than influencing policy in Sri Lanka forcefully, it should undertake reconstruction work at the grassroots. On-the-ground advocacy and informal diplomacy can improve chances for more Tamil-friendly policy actions over time.

Economically, India and China have been Sri Lanka’s biggest exporters. India must continue to look at increasing bilateral ties through trade. India’s previous trade policy was rejected by Sri Lanka in 2008, as it was seen a way of creating hegemony over Sri Lanka. A friendlier trade agreement will hold India in good stead. This will help create a level of trust between the two nations, and ensure that both its goals – of Tamil reintegration and of maintaining its sphere of influence – are met.          


[i] Also check Arms Trade with Sri Lanka – global business, local costs. Jonas Lindberg, Camilla Orjuella, Siemon Wezeman, Linda Akerstrom.