Sunday, 14 October 2012

Countering Terrorism in India: Taking a page out of Indonesia’s book

Indonesia has witnessed insurgencies and terrorism, especially post the Bali bombings of 2002. Since then, the Government of Indonesia has taken steps to counter terrorists and terror networks in the region without damaging people’s faith in the system.

The Indonesian government has separated their counter-terrorism forces from their armed forces. Indonesia introduced Detachment 88, on June 30, 2003, set up with the help of the American and Australian governments. The force is entirely Indonesian with a geographically well spread out intelligence service. These forces have a separate deradicalisation unit that take on militants and help them deal with captivity better and convince them against the use of violence.

The unit is aware of who they are working with and are made to read and understand the Qur’an. Captured militants are given a copy of the Qur’an and are taught that jihad is only a very small portion of the Holy Book. Experts in religious studies guide the unit with just the amount of information and empathy they require in their jobs.

The inmates are considered ideologically confused individuals rather than hardened criminals. This helps improve understanding towards the inmates and facilitates communication. The unit works towards strengthening the channels of communication between them and the inmates.

The detachment is not allowed to use any form of torture to get the desired information from the inmates. Instead, they are questioned politely and repeatedly in the presence of the Qur’an. The method, as simple as it sounds, is said to work. It helps to convert terrorists into obliging sources. Since the inmates are an abundant source of information with terrorist locations and their plans, it makes sense to win their confidence.

In order to extend a hand of comfort, the prisoners often pray in the company of their captors. This brings about a feeling of trust and faith thus reducing the gap between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The inmates begin to realise their captors are not infidels. Many hardliners have changed their stance and begun assisting the police in nabbing and converting more militants. The families of those who assist the police are taken care of by the government in terms of the children’s tuition fees, spouses’ employment and wedding expenses.

The unit is given a background of all the inmates to induce empathy amongst unit members.

The information makes it easier for the unit member to treat each inmate differently and understand the prisoner better.

This relationship does not end by sentencing of the inmate to imprisonment. The detachment ensures that once the former captive is released, he is employed. The government plays an active role in ensuring that the former prisoner is treated humanely, given protection and guaranteed a job. The lure of a better pay package with no assurance does not seem so enticing after all.

The principle of converting a terrorist into an informer is humane and less pain inducing.

Statistics say the method has helped change at least 50 per cent of hardliners into renouncing violence and/or becoming police informers. The same principles can be applied to Kashmir while combating insurgency.

For years the Government of India has dealt with the Kashmir issue publicly and has come under the scanner of various human rights organisations; it has been the bone of contention between India and the Unites States of America, and has been the basis on which India and Pakistan have defined their relationship.

Kashmir has always reaped the benefits of better relations between India and Pakistan during peace dialogues - trade and transport routes and the flow of people from Pakistan occupied Kashmir in to the India. Kashmiris felt the repercussions of the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 after the central government decided to revoke their benefits. This and the constant presence of armed forces in the Valley have led to more than one bloody protest against the Indian institution.

Successive governments have treated the unrest in Kashmir as a law and order problem that can be silenced by suppression and force. Consecutive governments have failed to see the issue as an identity crisis rather than an anomaly in peace. Adding to this, in 1990, the army was called to bring peace and order.

The government implemented the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act (AFSPA) the same year never repealing it since. The Act, given its draconian nature and the atrocities on human rights, has attracted international attention. Local political parties have used the Act as a raison d’ĂȘtre for coming into power. The youth and parties like the Hurriyat Conference used the Act to justify violent protests in the Valley.

The Act has managed to maintain law and order but only for a short period of time. The dissent in the Valley has been difficult to judge given the increasing number of people in the region coming out to exercise their vote. However, peace in Kashmir will be unattainable unless the Indian government is able to make some serious policy changes towards the state.

The Narasimha government did try to initiate change with the creation of the National Human Rights Commission in 1993. The organisation demonstrated autonomy but has been unable to bring perpetrators to justice given how information is shrouded under the label of official secrets.

The Army, with much success, have converted former militants into ikhwans or informers.

They work to bolster the security of villages and divulge information to the armed forces about terrorist activity within the area. The army uses former militants covered with mask to pick suspected terrorists whilst keeping their identity intact.

However, these concepts have clashed with the AFSPA. The issue is far from forgotten.

People claim they have been cheated time and again by the local and central government, resorting to violence. The Government of India seems to have failed in capturing the hearts and minds of people in its struggle to initiate Kashmir into mainland India.

The Kashmir issue is not one to die soon. It will take a while before the Kashmiris are ready to start afresh. A policy change in the right direction, however, could provide the required impetus for the paradigm shift to take place.

Introducing a team, like the Detachment Unit in Indonesia, will take time in India.

However, given the demographics in Kashmir, adopting this model will not be impossible. A small step towards repealing the AFSPA in Jammu and Kashmir and later in other disturbed areas can be the first step towards winning the hearts and minds of the people for a long lasting relationship.

Wednesday, 1 August 2012

The Bridge to Lanka: India’s changing Foreign Policy towards Sri Lanka, and the way forward


Three years after the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka, the government is still struggling to integrate former Tamil Tigers into society. After the war, the Sri Lankan government made it mandatory for former fighters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to undergo a six stage rehabilitation programme. The two year long programme grants them general amnesty if they complete it successfully. If they don’t participate, however, they will face terrorism charges. Nevertheless, former Tigers who have completed the programme are having a hard time coming to terms with their past, and resuming normal lives.

Given the Sri Lankan government’s ineffective efforts to reconcile with the Tamil community and rehabilitate internally displaced persons (IDPs), it becomes imperative to look at how India will react to this conflict next door. India’s position as a regional power in South Asia with a large and influential Tamil population meant that the international community has always expected India to play a significant role in conflict management in the region. However, history, culture and politics have influenced Indo-Sri Lankan ties from the very beginning of the conflict.

Despite Sri Lanka’s reluctance to offer citizenship to Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka after independence in 1948, India and the island country maintained friendly ties over the years, given their shared history. However, things changed in the 70s, when discontent amidst the Sri Lankan Tamil community gave rise to a youth-led uprising, and the subsequent birth of the LTTE. Sporadic violent attacks against the government won the LTTE support and sympathisers in the Tamil community.

In particular, the agitation in Sri Lanka ignited passions across the border in India’s Tamil Nadu. The central government in India, led by Indira Gandhi, was determined not to isolate the Tamil population and thus prescribed a hardening of India’s foreign policy towards Sri Lanka. Gandhi’s government went all out in support of Tamil rebel groups, to the extent of providing ammunition to the LTTE as well as training them on Indian territory. This stance was strongly pursued to keep external influences at bay and ensure India’s sphere of influence in South Asia.

After Mrs Gandhi’s assassination, her son Rajiv Gandhi brought about a 180 degree policy change, with efforts to bring peace to the island country. Upon assuming power, Rajiv Gandhi officially put an end to India’s assistance to the Tamil Tigers, both monetary and military. He wanted India to play the role of a negotiator in the conflict, and made several attempts to mediate between the two parties. India imposed a ceasefire in Sri Lanka in the hope of disbanding and disarming the rebelling Tamils, and bringing about peaceful negotiations. To ensure that the LTTE laid down its arms, he sent the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to the LTTE strongholds in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka. The decision led to the loss of lives of many IPKF officials, Tamil rebels and civilians in Sri Lanka. The move fuelled strong discontent among the LTTE, leading to Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1989, during his visit to Tamil Nadu.

With all evidence pointing to the LTTE, the rebel group was categorised as a terrorist organisation, with Prabhakaran, its founder, becoming a wanted man in India. This called for yet another policy change towards Sri Lanka. From 1991, India decided not to interfere in matters pertaining to the LTTE, labelling it as Sri Lanka’s internal matter. However, India did crack down on LTTE supporters in Tamil Nadu supplying ammunition to the group.

The Sri Lankan government also opposed mediation by other countries till 2002, when Norway was allowed to mediate with the LTTE. India began to keep a watchful eye on affairs in Sri Lanka. While not overtly interfering, India would occasionally call for political settlement, while also maintaining that it wanted Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and integrity to remain intact. This could be seen as India’s way of dealing with the spill-over of the LTTE conflict – fear of Tamil separatism within its borders and Tamil refugees entering India for succour.

In 2005, Mahinda Rajpaksa, a right-wing politician, won the presidential elections in Sri Lanka and took a strong stand against the LTTE. He strengthened military capabilities, in preparation to put an end to the LTTE. Gradually moving onto the offensive, the Sri Lankan armed forces advanced into territories controlled by the LTTE by 2007. As the war intensified, India started providing military support to the Sri Lankan forces, in the form of training and defence equipment. Due to pressure on the Centre from the Indian Tamil community, India could not overtly support Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE. However, India did clandestinely gift Sri Lankan armed forces with helicopters and an off-shore patrol vessel, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute[i]. Citing the need to protect Indian fishermen, India deployed her navy and coast guard to patrol the sea. This brought the Sea Tigers (LTTE’s naval wing) under control. It was in Indian interests to see the Sri Lankan government crush the LTTE, to put an end to Tamil secessionism within Indian borders. China’s increasing influence in the region was also said to be a factor in pushing India towards providing Sri Lanka with assistance, despite DMK’s (a pro-LTTE party part of the UPA coalition) disapproval.

The Sri Lankan forces advanced steadily, and by 2008, the LTTE was forced into a corner. The rebels began to use civilians as human shields to hide from the incessant shelling, in the hope that this would garner international support for a ceasefire, allowing them time to regroup. With an eye on its own Tamil population, India publicly denounced Sri Lanka’s war conduct and said it would work towards improving the humanitarian situation. However, no action was taken; the DMK’s call for solidarity and support for the Tamil community in Sri Lanka did not translate to any policy change in the Centre.

In mid-2009, the LTTE was finally defeated when its leaders were declared dead and the remaining rebels chose to surrender.  In spite of international pressure on Sri Lanka to curb the violence, India supported Sri Lanka, in the hope to counter Chinese influence in South Asia, and offered support in reconstruction efforts.
Riding high on victory, Mahinda Rajpaksa called for early elections in 2010 to leverage popular support. This move attracted brickbats from the international community, which was already disappointed with Sri Lanka’s handling of the war’s endgame. It raised questions about political processes post the civil war, and highlighted the existing humanitarian crisis.

India’s stand on Sri Lanka took its toll on the Congress-DMK coalition when it lost out to AIADMK in Tamil Nadu during the 2011 state elections. The Congress-led UPA realised it had to act decisively, if it wanted to be seen as a force to reckon with in the south. In March 2012, India voted in favour of the UNHRC resolution demanding an action plan for rehabilitation and reconciliation of the displaced, missing and victims’ families. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, however, qualified his decision by saying that while India supports the Tamil community of Sri Lanka, it does not plan to interfere with Sri Lanka’s internal affairs. The current coalition, with DMK partnership, at the Centre and Congress’ wish to return to Tamil Nadu politics will prevent India from making overtly friendly foreign policy decisions regarding Sri Lanka. India will offer support only at a grass root level where it can be seen as aiding the Tamil population in Sri Lanka.

In conclusion, India has realised the need for it to pursue the issue of Tamil re-integration without compromising Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. Going forward, India should look at soft power diplomacy in the form of student exchange programmes, cultural programmes and sporting events. These would help initiate a cross-ethnic dialogue and sensitise the youth and adults on both sides towards the conflict, and the need for reconciliation. The Indian government should also help in bottom-up projects – rather than influencing policy in Sri Lanka forcefully, it should undertake reconstruction work at the grassroots. On-the-ground advocacy and informal diplomacy can improve chances for more Tamil-friendly policy actions over time.

Economically, India and China have been Sri Lanka’s biggest exporters. India must continue to look at increasing bilateral ties through trade. India’s previous trade policy was rejected by Sri Lanka in 2008, as it was seen a way of creating hegemony over Sri Lanka. A friendlier trade agreement will hold India in good stead. This will help create a level of trust between the two nations, and ensure that both its goals – of Tamil reintegration and of maintaining its sphere of influence – are met.          


[i] Also check Arms Trade with Sri Lanka – global business, local costs. Jonas Lindberg, Camilla Orjuella, Siemon Wezeman, Linda Akerstrom.