Three years after the end of the
civil war in Sri Lanka, the government is still struggling to integrate former
Tamil Tigers into society. After the war, the Sri Lankan government made it
mandatory for former fighters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to
undergo a six stage rehabilitation programme. The two year long programme grants
them general amnesty if they complete it successfully. If they don’t participate,
however, they will face terrorism charges. Nevertheless, former Tigers who have
completed the programme are having a hard time coming to terms with their past,
and resuming normal lives.
Given the Sri Lankan government’s
ineffective efforts to reconcile with the Tamil community and rehabilitate
internally displaced persons (IDPs), it becomes imperative to look at how India
will react to this conflict next door. India’s position as a regional power in
South Asia with a large and influential Tamil population meant that the
international community has always expected India to play a significant role in
conflict management in the region. However, history, culture and politics have
influenced Indo-Sri Lankan ties from the very beginning of the conflict.
Despite Sri Lanka’s reluctance to
offer citizenship to Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka after independence in 1948,
India and the island country maintained friendly ties over the years, given their
shared history. However, things changed in the 70s, when discontent amidst the Sri
Lankan Tamil community gave rise to a youth-led uprising, and the subsequent
birth of the LTTE. Sporadic violent attacks against the government won the LTTE
support and sympathisers in the Tamil community.
In particular, the agitation in
Sri Lanka ignited passions across the border in India’s Tamil Nadu. The central
government in India, led by Indira Gandhi, was determined not to isolate the
Tamil population and thus prescribed a hardening of India’s foreign policy towards
Sri Lanka. Gandhi’s government went all out in support of Tamil rebel groups,
to the extent of providing ammunition to the LTTE as well as training them on
Indian territory. This stance was strongly pursued to keep external influences
at bay and ensure India’s sphere of influence in South Asia.
After Mrs Gandhi’s assassination,
her son Rajiv Gandhi brought about a 180 degree policy change, with efforts to
bring peace to the island country. Upon assuming power, Rajiv Gandhi officially
put an end to India’s assistance to the Tamil Tigers, both monetary and
military. He wanted India to play the role of a negotiator in the conflict, and
made several attempts to mediate between the two parties. India imposed a
ceasefire in Sri Lanka in the hope of disbanding and disarming the rebelling
Tamils, and bringing about peaceful negotiations. To ensure that the LTTE laid
down its arms, he sent the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to the LTTE
strongholds in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka. The decision led to the loss of
lives of many IPKF officials, Tamil rebels and civilians in Sri Lanka. The move
fuelled strong discontent among the LTTE, leading to Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination
in 1989, during his visit to Tamil Nadu.
With all evidence pointing to the
LTTE, the rebel group was categorised as a terrorist organisation, with
Prabhakaran, its founder, becoming a wanted man in India. This called for yet
another policy change towards Sri Lanka. From 1991, India decided not to
interfere in matters pertaining to the LTTE, labelling it as Sri Lanka’s
internal matter. However, India did crack down on LTTE supporters in Tamil Nadu
supplying ammunition to the group.
The Sri Lankan government also
opposed mediation by other countries till 2002, when Norway was allowed to mediate
with the LTTE. India began to keep a watchful eye on affairs in Sri Lanka.
While not overtly interfering, India would occasionally call for political
settlement, while also maintaining that it wanted Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and
integrity to remain intact. This could be seen as India’s way of dealing with
the spill-over of the LTTE conflict – fear of Tamil separatism within its
borders and Tamil refugees entering India for succour.
In 2005, Mahinda Rajpaksa, a
right-wing politician, won the presidential elections in Sri Lanka and took a
strong stand against the LTTE. He strengthened military capabilities, in
preparation to put an end to the LTTE. Gradually moving onto the offensive, the
Sri Lankan armed forces advanced into territories controlled by the LTTE by
2007. As the war intensified, India started providing military support to the
Sri Lankan forces, in the form of training and defence equipment. Due to
pressure on the Centre from the Indian Tamil community, India could not overtly
support Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE. However, India did clandestinely gift
Sri Lankan armed forces with helicopters and an off-shore patrol vessel,
according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute[i].
Citing the need to protect Indian fishermen, India deployed her navy and coast
guard to patrol the sea. This brought the Sea Tigers (LTTE’s naval wing) under
control. It was in Indian interests to see the Sri Lankan government crush the
LTTE, to put an end to Tamil secessionism within Indian borders. China’s increasing
influence in the region was also said to be a factor in pushing India towards
providing Sri Lanka with assistance, despite DMK’s (a pro-LTTE party part of
the UPA coalition) disapproval.
The Sri Lankan forces advanced steadily,
and by 2008, the LTTE was forced into a corner. The rebels began to use civilians
as human shields to hide from the incessant shelling, in the hope that this
would garner international support for a ceasefire, allowing them time to regroup.
With an eye on its own Tamil population, India publicly denounced Sri Lanka’s
war conduct and said it would work towards improving the humanitarian
situation. However, no action was taken; the DMK’s call for solidarity and
support for the Tamil community in Sri Lanka did not translate to any policy
change in the Centre.
In mid-2009, the LTTE was finally
defeated when its leaders were declared dead and the remaining rebels chose to
surrender. In spite of international
pressure on Sri Lanka to curb the violence, India supported Sri Lanka, in the
hope to counter Chinese influence in South Asia, and offered support in
reconstruction efforts.
Riding high on victory, Mahinda
Rajpaksa called for early elections in 2010 to leverage popular support. This
move attracted brickbats from the international community, which was already
disappointed with Sri Lanka’s handling of the war’s endgame. It raised
questions about political processes post the civil war, and highlighted the
existing humanitarian crisis.
India’s stand on Sri Lanka took
its toll on the Congress-DMK coalition when it lost out to AIADMK in Tamil Nadu
during the 2011 state elections. The Congress-led UPA realised it had to act decisively,
if it wanted to be seen as a force to reckon with in the south. In March 2012,
India voted in favour of the UNHRC resolution demanding an action plan for rehabilitation
and reconciliation of the displaced, missing and victims’ families. Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, however, qualified his decision by saying that while
India supports the Tamil community of Sri Lanka, it does not plan to interfere
with Sri Lanka’s internal affairs. The current coalition, with DMK partnership,
at the Centre and Congress’ wish to return to Tamil Nadu politics will prevent
India from making overtly friendly foreign policy decisions regarding Sri
Lanka. India will offer support only at a grass root level where it can be seen
as aiding the Tamil population in Sri Lanka.
In conclusion, India has realised
the need for it to pursue the issue of Tamil re-integration without compromising
Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. Going forward, India should look at soft power
diplomacy in the form of student exchange programmes, cultural programmes and
sporting events. These would help initiate a cross-ethnic dialogue and sensitise
the youth and adults on both sides towards the conflict, and the need for
reconciliation. The Indian government should also help in bottom-up projects – rather
than influencing policy in Sri Lanka forcefully, it should undertake reconstruction
work at the grassroots. On-the-ground advocacy and informal diplomacy can
improve chances for more Tamil-friendly policy actions over time.
Economically, India and China
have been Sri Lanka’s biggest exporters. India must continue to look at increasing
bilateral ties through trade. India’s previous trade policy was rejected by Sri
Lanka in 2008, as it was seen a way of creating hegemony over Sri Lanka. A
friendlier trade agreement will hold India in good stead. This will help create
a level of trust between the two nations, and ensure that both its goals – of
Tamil reintegration and of maintaining its sphere of influence – are met.
[i] Also check Arms Trade with Sri Lanka
– global business, local costs. Jonas Lindberg, Camilla Orjuella, Siemon
Wezeman, Linda Akerstrom.
